This essay recounts the historical, political, and legal context in which Judge Ginsburg's ruling in the Wright case arose. This context explains the importance of her decision to the battle against segregated education and highlights as well the repeated efforts of powerful political forces, including the Reagan administration and congressional conservatives, to cripple efforts to prohibit racially discriminatory private schools from receiving federal subsidies through the tax system. This essay also aims to highlight Wright's place in the modern doctrine of educational discrimination.
I. "Seg Academies" and Tax-Exempt Status

A. The Importance of Tax-Exempt Status
For over a century, Congress has provided tax-exempt status to private schools that operate on a "not for profit" basis. The corporation income tax of 1894 specifically excluded from its coverage a broad array of nonprofit organizations, including educational institutions. 3 In 1917, the individual income tax (enacted in 1913) was amended to give an additional advantage to a narrower class of nonprofit entities-primarily schools, churches, hospitals, and organizations for relief of the poor-by permitting their donors to deduct charitable contributions. 4 In later years, nonprofit organizations were also permitted to abstain from paying social security and unemployment taxes. Board of Education that public school segregation is unconstitutional. 6 Segregation academies, private schools formed to avoid the mandate of Brown, sought and received federal tax-exempt status. 7 Civil rights groups sued to prevent these schools from receiving federal tax benefits. Throughout the controversy, segregated private schools fought hard to retain exempt status. 9 Yet most of these schools lacked net income, because receipts are generally more than offset by expenses.
While the exemption does confer immunity from social security and unemployment taxes, this benefit was not usually cited as important. 10 According to the IRS, the primary reason for seeking exempt status was so that gifts to a school can be deducted as charitable donations.
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The deduction of claimed contributions, however, is proper only if the payments are truly charitable donations and are not made in payment for educational services. If the payment is required, explicitly or informally, as a condition of a student's enrollment, then its formal designation as a "contribution" is not controlling; the payment is treated as tuition and nondeductible. 12 In general, courts have regarded whether such a payment is "voluntary" and without "expectation of commensurate benefit" as a matter of subjective intent and have stated that the determination of intent depends on the facts and circumstances of each particular case. 
15
To the extent that the value of educational services to the donor's children exceeded designated tuition, a contribution was to be treated as nondeductible. The new revenue ruling was protested by the entire private school community, which complained about the automatic disqualification of parents as donors to the extent that the real costs of educating their children exceeded tuition. 16 In December 1980 the Treasury told Congress that secular and sectarian private schools had agreed on a compromise that would supersede Revenue Ruling 79-99.
17
The compromise accepted the subjective standard, but then set forth objective criteria from which subjective intent could be more easily inferred. Certain enumerated factors, alone or in combination, would imply that the contribution was made "in expectation of obtaining educational benefits" for the donor and therefore was not deductible: for example, the denial of admission to children of taxpayers who do not contribute; or the absence of a significant tuition in a school that places unusual pressure on parents to contribute. 
21
Because of the claim that a federal statute was being applied in violation of the Constitution, a three-judge federal court was convened.
22
On January 12, 1970, the court issued a preliminary injunction ordering the IRS to 19 Id. at 228-31. 20 Until 1965, exempt status was routinely granted to private schools without regard to practices of racial discrimination. In the mid-1960s, however, the IRS decided to re-examine this policy in the light of Brown v. 26 Id. at 1157-59. 27 Id. at 1160. 28 Id. at 1161. 29 Id. at 1163. 30 Id. To obviate any possible confusion the court is not to be misunderstood as laying down a special rule for schools 31 Id. at 1164-65. 32 
C. Lax Enforcement
Despite the ringing affirmation of the Green principle-that exempt status must be withheld from racially discriminatory private schools-enforcement of that principle in practice was lax. In the thirteen-year period, following the first order in Green and preceding then Judge Ginsburg's opinion in Wright v. Regan, tax-exempt status was withheld from only 111 schools that enrolled probably no more than 50,000 students. In 1978, the U.S. Civil Rights Commission counted 3,500 schools that were created or substantially expanded at the time of local school desegregation.
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(All 3,500 may not have discriminated, but it was reasonable to assume that a substantial proportion did, given the propinquity in time of the schools' creation or expansion to desegregation efforts.) Perhaps the most pointed evidence of nonenforcement was that a number of private schools adjudged by federal courts to be discriminatory, and therefore ineligible for direct aid to education, continued to enjoy federal income-tax exemptions. 54 While there was no consensus as to the total number of segregated private schools, even the lowest estimate indicated that only a tiny fraction was denied exemption.
The gap between principle and practice resulted from implementing procedures, under which a school obtained a taxexemption merely by declaring that it did not discriminate. Once the required declaration was made, the school was presumed nondiscriminatory, and the presumption was rarely challenged. 51 Terjen, supra note 7, at 50. 52 publication in a "newspaper of general circulation that serves all racial segments of the locality"; 2) "broadcast media" that reach "all segments of the community the school serves"; 3) "school brochures and catalogues" if "distributed . . . to all segments of the community that the school serves"; or 4) advising "leaders of racial minorities . . . so that they in turn will make this policy known to other members of their race." the IRS adopted somewhat more 55 The temporary Green order, issued the previous January, offered no guidance on implementation. Second, the policy has to be publicized either in a "newspaper" or through the "broadcast media." Third, the publicity has to occur "during the period of . . . solicitation for students . . . during the school's registration period." Revenue Procedure-assumed that a mere declaration of policy was adequate to enforce the Green principle. Yet according to the U.S.
Civil Rights Commission, the Justice Department under Presidents
Ford and Carter, and a congressional study, even the heavier burden of publication imposed in 1975 was easily met by schools that in fact practiced racial discrimination. 61 Most simply declared that they did not discriminate and thus obtained exemptions.
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Only the handful 60 1975-2 C.B. 587-88. The second requirement of publicity through the mass media is, however, relaxed for three kinds of schools. A church-related school drawing at least 75% of its students from the sponsoring religious denomination may announce its anti-discrimination policy in a church newspaper. A school drawing a substantial percentage of students from a large geographical area may demonstrate reasonable efforts to inform students of its policy. A school with a meaningful number of minority students is entirely exempt. Id. at 588-89. 61 The positions of the Civil Rights Commission, the Ford Justice Department, and the Carter Justice Department are reported in Implementation Hearings, supra note 9, at 221-35, 237-51, 1175-87. A staff report expressed general agreement with their conclusions, Staff Report, supra note 54, at 21. 62 According to Rep. Sam Gibbons:
Not surprisingly, this [has] proved inadequate. It was a bit like asking the average American taxpayer to simply mail in a check for his taxes, along with an affirmation that the amount enclosed was correct, without requiring any specific figures or documentation.
Implementation Hearings, supra note 9, at 1. Both suits were consolidated, but the proceedings were suspended in 1978, when the IRS published its own proposal for stricter enforcement. 64 The proposal was derived from criteria developed by federal district courts for identifying segregated private schools ineligible for state textbook aid.
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The new IRS enforcement proposal focused not on self-serving declarations but on two objective factors: the propinquity in time of a private school's formation or expansion to public school desegregation, and the private school's proportion of minority enrollment. Any private school formed or substantially expanded at the time of local public school desegregation would be presumed discriminatory unless its minority enrollment was at least 20 percent of the proportion of minorities in the local community's school age population. 66 The presumption could be rebutted only by engaging in four of five specified practices designed to attract minority students and faculty. 67 Public reaction to the 1978 proposal was overwhelmingly negative. The IRS received over 150,000 letters, virtually all in opposition, and the public was invited to comment during three days of hearings at the IRS national office. 68 As a result of the criticism, the proposal was made substantially less rigid and was republished in 1979. 69 Under the revised proposal, the presumption of discrimination would arise only if minority enrollment was "insignificant" (in addition to the school being founded or expanded at the time of local public school desegregation), and rebuttal of an unfavorable presumption was made considerably easier. 70 These changes, however, were not sufficient to overcome the negative public reaction. 
Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization (EKWRO).
78 75 The restrictions remained in force during the 1981 and 1982 fiscal years because Treasury funds were provided through continuing resolutions, which automatically carried through any restrictions on appropriations enacted in the previous fiscal year. Continuing In EKWRO, indigent plaintiffs challenged a Revenue Ruling permitting a hospital, to receive tax-exempt status regardless of whether it provided free or below cost service to the poor. The plaintiffs lacked standing, the Supreme Court declared, because it "is purely speculative whether the denials of service specified in the complaint fairly can be traced to (the Ruling) or instead result from decisions made by the hospitals without regard to the tax implications." 94 Id. at 568. The proceedings were remanded to the District Court for findings as to whether the nonexclusive "use of zoos, museums, parks, and other recreational facilities by private school groups in common with others . . . involves the government so directly as to violate the equal protection clause." Id. at 570. Four Justices would have declared unconstitutional, without remand, the nonexclusive use of facilities, such as athletic fields, that relieve [the schools] of the Given these precedents, Judge Ginsburg concluded:
Green, Norwood, and Gilmore presented plaintiffs whose standing seems to us indistinguishable on any principled ground from the standing of the plaintiffs in this action. If the plaintiffs before us are not entitled to question the IRS practices at issue here, it is difficult to comprehend why the Green, Norwood, and Gilmore plaintiffs were entitled to challenge the tax exemptions, textbook loans, and specially reserved park facilities at issue in those cases. Moreover, Justice Brennan continued, the allegations in the complaint were more than sufficient to satisfy standing requirements:
[T]he respondents have alleged a direct causal relationship between the Government action they challenge and the injury they suffer: their inability to receive an education in a racially integrated school is directly and adversely affected by the tax-exempt status granted by the IRS to racially discriminatory schools in their respective school districts. Common sense alone would recognize that the elimination of tax-exempt status for racially discriminatory private schools would serve to lessen the impact that those institutions have in defeating efforts to desegregate the public schools.
that the granting of preferential tax treatment to segregated schools does not make those schools more attractive to white students and hence does not inhibit the process of desegregation." benefit from federal tax-exempt status. 105 The Atlantic also claimed that at least 35 such schools continue to operate in the Mississippi Delta. expenses that is allowed to arrive at a "true" income figure.
The income measurement view starts with the generally accepted standard, the Haig-Simons definition:
Personal income may be defined as the algebraic sum of
(1) the market value of rights exercised in consumption and (2) the change in value of the store of property rights between the beginning and end of the period in question. Consider a doctor and a lawyer, both of whom wish to contribute to a hospital. The doctor works five hours a week on the wards without pay. Because his contribution takes the form of imputed income from services, the donation is disregarded in determining his taxable income. The lawyer contributes the fees from five hours of legal work. His position is like the doctor's except that he donates income in nonimputed cash form, which means that it must be reported as income. In order to treat the lawyer the same as the doctor, an offsetting deduction for the cash donation might be allowed. Nevertheless, as a general rule we do not correct for differences in treatment caused by nontaxation of imputed income. If a lawyer pays someone else to write a will or a baker buys another's cakes, no deduction is allowed for the expenditure even though each might have consumed his own services and thereby realized no taxable income.
The income measurement view also appears at odds with the general rule (to which the charitable deduction is a clear exception) that ordinary gifts may not be deducted.
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Why do gifts to the Red Cross and Yale
See also Andrews, supra note 98, at 356-57: Many contributions are to private schools, whose student bodies are probably still disproportionately representative of the affluent part of the population. 123 See Andrews, supra note 98, at 352-4; and Bittker, supra note 98, at 59-60. 9-60. 124 Congress appears to have consistently regarded the charitable deduction as a subsidy rather than an income measurement provision. For example, in 1938 when foreign charities were excluded from the category of eligible donees, the House Ways and Means Committee explained:
The [deduction] is based upon the theory that the Government is compensated for the loss of revenue by its relief from financial burden which would otherwise have to be met by appropriations from public funds . . . . The United States University reduce the donor's Haig-Simons income, but not gifts to the Committee to Reelect the President or a favorite nephew? Gifts to ordinary donees are, in the same sense, neither saved nor consumed by the donor.
And the general rule is not considered to cause overtaxation even if the donor is in a higher tax bracket than the donee or if a disparity exists vis-avis donors who make gifts of imputed income.
The critical problem for proponents of the income measurement view is to justify special treatment for charitable gifts when ordinary gifts are not deductible. They appear to rely primarily on the idea that gifts to charity, unlike gifts to relatives or friends that finance private consumption, satisfy a moral obligation or provide desirable public goods: Almost all charitable organizations other than those that distribute alms to the poor produce something in the nature of common or social goods or services. The benefit produced by a derives no such benefit from gifts to foreign institutions, and the proposed limitation is consistent with the above theory. General education makes better citizens . . . .
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In the end, whether or not we consider the charitable deduction generally to be an income measurement provision depends on a whole range of value judgments, all of which are debatable. This uncertainty reflects the fact that the generally accepted standard for income measurement --the Haig-Simons rule --lacks precision and does not always provide clear or easy answers. The inexactness of the standard has been used to criticize the view of the charitable deduction as equivalent to a direct grant in other contexts, such as devising a comprehensive tax base or compiling a tax expenditure budget. 127 Nevertheless, unless segregated education is deemed to serve a moral goal or provide a desirable public good, then a critical premise of the income measurement view (that may be appropriate in other contexts) is not valid in this specific case.
